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When X began my studies as an undergraduate, I had 
no idea what was in store for me. X thought college was 
going to classes, writing papers, and taking exams. Never­
theless, four years later and about to have a degree with 
two major fields of interest, international relations and 
international economics, bestowed upon me, X realise that 
college is much, much more. The experiences of college 
should not be limited to the classroom and to books. X 
wholeheartedly feel sorry for those students (and I feel 
there are many of them) who can never let themselves ex­
perience the people and their ideas beyond the classroom.
However, this is not answering why The Formulation of 
Sovlet-Amerlcan Trade Policy was written. X feel this the­
sis is the culmination of my classroom experiences and 
learning. X have avidly, and with much pleasure, studied 
many areas of international relations and find this aspect 
most fascinating.
X feel that the political relations between the Soviet 
Union and the United States reflect the most important area 
of international conflict. These nations alone have Arma­
geddon at their disposal. While, at the same time, they 
also have the power to being about more peaceful relations 
to the world as a whole, if they so desire.
Then why not limit my discussion to the political
v
strife between « m  two nations and leave international com­
ma res out of tha discussion? For two reasonst l) tha U.8.- 
S.U. alto have two moat contrasting economies of comparable 
sise and tha interaction of those differences have interest­
ing ramifications. 2) The question of interdependence brings 
to me, the ultimate hope of world peace. I believe this 
because of the motivating factors of economics. That is to 
say, once interdependence is established the two nations 
will find it almost impossible to disengage without causing 
severe havoc on their economies. Once settling their eco­
nomic problems the nations will find i t easier to maintain 
normal relations causing less uncertainty throughout the 
world.
I suppose this argument is open to much criticism. 
However, returning to what college has taught met there 
would not be any change in this world if men did not pursue 
their ideals and goals. My commencement gives me this 
chance with better understanding.
OW
May 12, 1982
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788 FORMULATION OP 80VIBT-AM8RXCAN 
TRADE POLICY
Perhaps no aingla topic of contemporary world affaira 
has generated more public debate than Eaat-Weat relationa. 
the diviaion of the world into a bipolar antagonistic re­
lationship between the United States and the Soviet Union 
after World War II set the stage for political conjecture 
in every walk of life. While most of th<a discussion has 
revolved around the shadow of the twentieth century—nuclear 
arms, there exists an equally important issue for the main­
tenance of world peace—East-west commerce. Although this 
aspect may appear rather anticlimatic in the light of nu­
clear conflagration, it is a stable world economy that has 
the prophylactic effect on peaceful relations. Senator 
Walter D. Mondale explicated this view in 1974:
While the major international security 
issues of the last quarter century are 
still with us . . . these are now being 
overshadowed by the risk that the inter­
national economy may spin out of control.
For if this happens there will be no 
graver threat to intarnational stability 
. . . and to national security itself.1
Therefore, this thesis, given the above to be true, will 
analyse the issues of East-west trade, limiting the scope 
of the topic tj Soviet-American trade. The reasons for
this limitation are simple. rim , the United States and 
tha Soviet Union ara the primary actor* in East-Neat rela- 
tiona. Second, it in easier to maintain conciaanaas and 
elarity with only two aetora. However, thin doea not imply 
that ralatad relevant issues will not ba pursued, such aa 
Allied support for economic policies, but rather they will 
ba secondary. Third, significant parallels may be intui- 
tivaly drawn from Soviet-American commerce to tha entire 
scope on international trade such as Bast-west trade.
Despite tha cries of tha last two decades there has 
been little improvement in trade relations between the 
United States and the Soviets. The Kissinger linkage poli­
cies and the hopes of interdependence as a method for fur­
thering detente have fallen into the past, while a new matted 
is becoming the strong-arm of America's foreign policyi 
economic sanctions. The imposition of these sanctions or 
embargos has changed America's diplomatic style in dealing 
with the Russians. It is this change of style that has 
caused much controversy among analysts of policy. Indeed 
the political and moral crises of Afghanistan and Poland 
warranted public chastisement by American and world leaders. 
However, the imposition of sanctions for these acts must be 
questioned for several reasons. While sanctions gave the 
actions taken by Presidents Carter and Reagan more impact 
and credibility, the costs on the American economy must be 
considered. Especially when the support or lack thereof of 
our allies is taken into account. It is this increasing use
2
3of America '* so—ionic prowss# that will bs tha overriding 
issue of this treatise.
This thesis will net examine whether or not trade with 
Russia should exist, for it is ay opinion that trade is vital 
for the growth of the American economy, but rather, to which 
ends the American government should lisdlt trade. Presently, 
the United Statee holds the ehsolata wad comparative advan- 
teges on three conmodities ewer the « M t  of the world, so­
phisticated weapon technology, computer technology, and ag­
ricultural productivity and output. Clearly, tha first two 
have national security limitations attached to them in trade 
potential. However, the third, agricultural output, is of 
major consequence to the United States due to recent eaeplu* 
harvests and Soviet agricultural failures. There cam be no 
argument that trade be denied on a national security basis 
in times of peace. Therefoze, several questions need to be 
answered: 1) Does the United States have tha right to re­
strict trade on political grounds? 2) Should the United 
States impose sanctions when the Soviet Union is acting in 
their historic sphere of influence? 3) Can tbe aae of food 
as a means of implementing political change be morally 
justified?
Through this brief introduction it has been demon­
strated that tha imposition of trade sanctions or embargos 
on the Soviets is at the least problematic. Therefore, this 
thesis will attempt to analyte the satire scope of tads re­
lations emphasizing uha grain embargos of tha reosst past.
4WaUld he hopeful that the benefit* of America'« newest 
V»e*J?Qh outweigh the eoit oh the economy, however Studies 
have increasingly shown this not to be true. Therefore, 
the goal of this treatise is to develop a consensus dpihlon 
that Soviet-American trade is needed and necessary. Then, 
in the end, policy recommendation* will be made for a new 
course of actldh retarding trade With the iovilt Vhicu*
in order to fulfill this elective this paber will be 
oowprehehliv* in its discussion. It will chronologically 
analyse the historic precedenta of trade and Vti role ih 
the formulation of policy. The infrastructure* of trade, 
both the American and Soviet, will be analysed to damohstrate 
how policy is presently developed. The Soviet agricultural 
system will also be analysed to demonstrate why agricultural 
trade is so significant. The grain trade end its agreements 
will also be discussed debating the costs and benefits to 
the American economy. Finally, a chapter on trade policy 
and ite role in furthering detente will be proposed.
5Notes
lWalter F. Mondale, H 
national Economic Security,
p • 1 •
Beyond Detente: Toward Inter-
" Foreign Affaire (October 1974),
CHAPTER 1
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON TRADE
To comprehend fully the policies of Soviet-American 
trade, one must understand the pertinence of historical 
precedents of trade in the Russian economy. Throu9hout 
history Russia has maintained a technologically backward 
agrarian society.
The advent of modern Russia occurred shortly after 
the Napoleonic Wars and during the next hundred-odd years 
great changes took place. Technology was once again intro­
duced from the West by the Tsars, especially Tsar Alexander, 
who gave the serfs land for the first time.
The establishment of cannon land owners and Russia's 
equivalent to the Western industrial revolution were great 
strides in bringing the country onto a par basis with all 
aspects of western civilization. However, a level of pari­
ty with the West was never attained prior to World War One. 
The destruction of the World War and the subsequent civil 
war after the Bolshevik seizure of power, during the October 
Revolution in 1917, had devastating effects on the economy. 
The Russians were forced to rebuild their nation with help 
from the West. This brief synopsis of Russian importation 
of western technology demonstrates what is still a major 
motivating factor in Soviet trade with the United States:
6
the Importation of technologically superior goods.
Post World War I and Stalin
The following section will examine the pattern of trade 
between the Soviet Union and America from the beginning of 
the 1920s to the era of detente. It should be noted that 
most of the trade between the two countries was, though very 
limited, definitely controlled by the vastly economically 
superior United States and many of the Soviet policies, 
though hidden in rhetorical propaganda, were reactions to 
America's plans and policies. "Thus to achieve self-suffi­
ciency in the modern world it was first necessary to accel­
erate Russia's own industrialization. To accomplish this, 
however, partial 'dependency' on foreign nations and foreign 
technology became necessary."1 The importation of American 
technology, including entire factories, and relief aid were 
a major source of the Soviet's recovery plan funding. This 
plan, called NEP (New Economic Policy), proposed the re­
building of the economy through technology importation.
Stalin, who came to power during this period, as did his 
predecessors, saw this importation as a necessary evil and 
only to be used until the economy could be free from the 
capitalistic West. According to Albert L. Weeks in The 
Other Side of Coexistence, the Soviets received from America, 
during this period, under the American Relief Administration 
(ARA) a "staggering (for that time) $66.3 million"2 of food­
stuffs and other assistance. After the formulation of the
8first five year plan, Soviet purchases of American techno­
logy expanded tremendously, and from 1926 purchases went 
from 96 million rubles to 207 million rubles in 1930. Pur­
chases then fell in the next two years to 25 million rubles. 
The primary reason for this curtailment of trade was the 
fact that the Soviets found themselves in a severe economic 
depression, along with the rest of the world, and were unable 
to pay for these purchases from the West. However, to dis­
guise the true reasons for this reduction, the Soviets re­
sponded with a rash of trials for sabotage and "wrecking of 
the economy" against foreign technicians, specialists, and 
engineers, and had them removed from the country for national 
security reasons.3 This removal of technicians coincided 
with the beginning of Stalin's consolidation of power during 
the Great Purge of the late thirties (when millions lost 
their lives to Stalin's xenophobia) and he did not want any 
interference from foreigners.
The thirties also saw a significant change in other 
aspects of the Russian economy. When Stalin forced the col­
lectivisation of private agriculture into Collectives (kolk- 
hos) and State (sovkhoz) farms the burden on the farmers 
became even greater. In addition to losing their family 
farms and plots, the support or costs of the forced industri­
alization was also shouldered by the Soviet farmers. Conse­
quently, millions of Russians died of starvation in the 
early thirties. The irony of this horror was the Soviets 
from the late twenties through the early forties exported
9their grain, sonatinas in amounts graater than thay imported. k 
All in all, Stalin's aconomic plans and faars brought the 
Soviat Union into a stata of autarky. For example, "In 
1937, exports and imports each amounted to only less than 
one-haIf of one percent of the gross national product, com­
pared to tan to twelve percent before the revolution."5
The United States Congress in 1934 passed the Johnson 
Debt Default Act, which prohibited the extension of credits 
or loans by any private American bank or corporation to any 
country which had defaulted on their World War debts to the 
United States. However, this Act did not apply to federal 
government loans or credits extended to the offending nations. 
Since the Soviet Union had defaulted on their loans, this 
piece of legislation became the basis for restricting trade 
with the Soviets. It should be noted that the Act was not 
unilaterally enforced, but rather served as a political tool 
in the formulation of American foreign trade policios with 
the Soviets. Later, when the Soviets defaulted on their 
Lend-Lease debts of World War II, which totaled to more than 
$11.0 billion owed to the United States alone, the Act was 
again enforced to prohibit any loans to the Soviets. After 
much internal debate in the State Department, writes Richard 
Barnet in The Giantsi Russia and Americai
The Russians ware invited to participate 
in the Marshall Flan for the recovery of 
Europe in 1947, but the terms were such as 
to make it inevitable that Stalin would 
decline. The United States, not wishing 
to subsidise the consolidation of Soviet
10
power in Eastern Europe, insisted on con­
trolling how the money was to be spent.
But the last thing Stalin was prepared to 
accept was the assertion of American poli­
tical influence in his newly acquired em­
pire, and the Soviets withdrew from the 
Marshall Plan.6
Fran this point on, the United States used its economic 
might in its containment policy for the Soviet Union.
Cold War Trade
It was this period that the United States was the 
greatest power in the world, economically, as well as mili­
tarily, and its policies were directed at the complete iso­
lation of the Soviet Union. The Export Control Act of 1949 
and the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1951, usually re­
ferred to as the "Battle Act," were passed to prevent the 
exportation of anything which had potential military or 
strategic value to the Soviets. The countries which were 
involved in the Act were members of the Consultive Group 
Coordinating Committee (COCOM), whose existence was also 
established under the Act. The neater countries were the 
United States, the European Economic CosaSLttee, and Japan. 
Also, in 1951, Congress withdrew the Mast Favored Nation 
(MFN) status from the Soviets, although at this tine trade 
was already heavily restricted, Mowever, this action did 
become important in fsturw trade negotiations.7
Trade during the Cold Mae esa was never for economic 
benefit, but rather eaw a peliricnl tool used to manipulate
The Russia autarkic
11
•tat* from tha Wastarn world, undar Stalin, only provad tha 
Soviet loader's resolve to remain independent from the world 
economy. Nevertheless, Stalin did make conciliatory gestures 
in 1951 conveying tha impression that tha Soviet Union had 
outgrown autarky. Under this theme, the Soviets invited 
many Western businessmen to a foreign trade convention in 
Moscow during April 1952. However, it was of little conse­
quence as the United States controlled exports so effectively 
that they prohibited the opening of Soviet and East-bloc 
markets to American business.8
There were many reasons for the decline of trade in 
the fifties, many of which were more pragmatic, than poli­
tical, in nature for the Soviet Union. First, the recon­
struction of Europe after the war on both sides caused a 
sever* financial drain on the more devastated economies of 
Eastern Europe and Russia. Hence, the Soviet Union because 
of ualance of payment problems was forced to curtail trade 
with the (test. Second, the Marshall Plan, as mentioned 
above was unacceptable to Stalin, thereby causing a natural 
migration of trade within each bloc.9 Although trade be­
tween the Soviets and America remained virtually nonexistent 
in the late fifties, America's allies, in seeking new mar­
kets, began to trade at this time with the East, much to 
America's chagrin. This trade became quite significant for 
it caused increased domestic pressure in the United States 
to remove restrictions and open trade with the Soviet market.
Xn analyzing Nikita Krushchev's international trade
12
policies with the Waat, a completa reversal from tha au­
tarkic state was evident. A few months after securing his 
power base in 1956, Khrushchev and Bulganin set out on an 
"offensive of international amicability" which reduced ten­
sions between Western Europe and the Soviets. However, the 
United States still remained unrelenting in their opposition 
of trade development. In June 1958, and again in 1959, 
Khrushchev and Mikoyan proposed that the Soviet Union and 
America expand commerce under a comprehensive trade agree­
ment; "peaceful commodities,"10 agricultural commodities.
The United States showed little interest in such expansion 
and the entire attempt by the Russians fell through.11
Khrushchev's motives for opening trade with the West 
were partially in response to domestic economic reforms. 
These reforms were heavily influenced by his desire to con­
solidate his political power base. This was possible be­
cause he reorganised the economy into many smaller indus­
trial regions, thereby removing his opposition within the 
party from Moscow to control these peripheral areas. Need­
less to say, his ideas were influenced by the Liberman eco­
nomic reform proposals. These proposals by Liberman called 
for a reduction in economic central planning; these proposed 
changes became official policy in 1962.12
The Beginnings of Normalisation
The early sixties saw no immediate change in the sta­
tus of Soviet-American trade especially in light of the
13
political trouble between the two countries, i.e., Gary F. 
Powers and the U-2 incident, the Berlin Wall, the Bay of 
Pigs invasion, and the Cuban Missile Crisis. After these 
tensions subsided, trade began a gradual up-swing as the 
United States permitted some trade with tbs Soviets. In 
1963 Russian agriculture suffered a severe crop failure 
which caused them to seek massive grain purchases on the 
world market. Since the United States was the principle 
supplier of grain on the market, the Soviets were forced to 
make purchases of 10 million tons from them and Canada.
These purchases were possible because the United States 
Supreme Court ruled that Eximbank short term loans, less 
than 90 days, which the Soviets needed to purchase grain, 
were exempt under the law.13 This purchase of grain was 
unlike these of the Stalin era when grain was exported at a 
rate greater than imports, regardless of the impact on the 
economy and state of people's welfare. Khrushchev made 
reference to this, pointing to the fact that for the first 
time, in 1963-64, imports exceeded exports at a substanti­
ally higher rate and that no Russians were dying of starva­
tion. Ironically, in spite of massive purchases from the 
United States, the Soviets refused to import enough grain 
to meet their seeds. Consequently they were forced into an 
early slaughter of their pig herd, reducing the herd size by 
forty percent, from 70 million head to 42 million.111 The 
probable reason for this was that the cost of grain was 
prohibitively high for the Soviets to justify greater hard
14
currency outflows. However, Soviet ideology maintained that 
they were yet free from any economic dependence on the rest 
of the world. Nevertheless, this independence from the cap* 
italists was changed shortly after when the Soviets decided 
to up-grade their standard diet and increase overall meat 
consumption. This could only be achieved through a depen­
dence of Soviet agriculture imports of grain from the 
United States.15
After the ouster of Khrushchev in 1964, Brezhnev and 
Kosygin set Russia back on the road of strict economic con­
trol . The Liberman economic reforms were removed from the 
economy and new policies were implemented to revamp the in­
centives to produce. The economic changes could be classi­
fied as a commitment to the consumers, the expansion of re­
search and development, and increases in productivity and 
efficiency. Trade with the United States during the next 
few years grew slowly. The outcry of American businessmen 
placed increased pressure on U.S. policy-makers to open up 
trade with the communists. During the next few years until 
the Export Administration Act of 1969, which removed restric­
tions from exportation commodities that were not of military 
value, and subsequently, trade between the two superpowers 
broadened significantly. After this period, there were 
major revisions in the restrictions on foreign trade; the 
Export Expansion Act of 1971 raised the ceiling on Eximbank 
loan guarantees from $3.5 billion to $10.0 billion and all 
financial activities with the Soviet Union to $20.0 billion.16
15
This was a drastic change in comparison to the restrictions 
on the Export-Import Bank during the Cold War, when almost 
no trade loans or credits existed. The Equal Export Oppor­
tunity Act of 1972 provided the legal framework for present 
export control. This Act regulated exports and imports in 
three ways.
First, special products, controlled for 
security reasons, must be approved for 
export by a governmental committee from 
the Departments of Commerce, Defense,
State, and Treasury: from other agencies
which may declare special interest. Sec­
ond, when government credits of guaran­
tees are sought through the Export-Import 
Bank or the Commodity Credit Corporation, 
special approval of the government portion 
of the financing must be guaranteed. Third, 
if complaints are lodged with the federal 
government on trade disruption, or dumping, 
provisions for restricting imports may be 
brought into force.17
Prior to 1972, United States trade with the Soviet 
Union had been considered mostly negative and was most 
definitely controlled by the United States because its 
economy was much stronger. The United States and the West 
did impose economic sanctions on Russia and the East, how­
ever, these sanctions were due to U.S. control of the inter­
national economic situation and in the late fifties its 
influence over its allies waned considerably. After this 
time, Europe and Japan began to increase trade with the 
Soviets and the East bloc much to America's dismay because 
it signaled the end of America's dominance of their econo­
mies. Consequently, America during the Johnson Administration
soon realized that the opportunities offered through trade 
with the communists were immense and international commerce 
slowly began to increase until 1972. The Nixon-Brezhnev May 
summit meeting and the October grain agreement of 1972 moved 
trade into a period which could be described as positive.
At this point, America and the Soviets signed a series of 
trade agreements along with cooperative agreements in other 
areas. The major obstacle in signing the agreements was the 
settlement of the Soviet Union's World War II Lend-Lease 
debts, "the Americans refusing to take less than $800 mil­
lion and the Soviets refusing to offer more than $300 mil­
lion."18 The issue was settled when the Soviets agreed to 
pay $722 million in annual installments of $24 million until 
the year 2001 and the American's offer to reinstate MFN sta­
tus by 1975. Nevertheless, in 1975 the Soviets annulled the 
trade agreement for several reasons such as the Jackson 
Amendment. This was the era of detente, the relaxing of 
tensions in all areas of interaction between the two nations.
Summary
This section on the historical perspective of Soviet- 
American trade, hopefully, demonstrated the major issues of 
international commerce and how it was governed, implemented, 
and maintained. Political ideology played the prominent 
role in trade relations as it did in all areas; the situa­
tion remains quite similar, but instead, the elements of de­
tente have replaced those of confrontation. The needs
16
basically continue: the Soviets seek the importation of
Western technology and agricultural commodities, while 
America is seeking a favorable trading partner to help in 
its balance of payments deficit and agricultural surpluses.
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CHAPTER TWO
SOVIET-AMERXCAM INFRASTRUCTURE OF TRADE
This section of the assay will focus on the separate 
systems, or infrastructures, of trade within which American* 
Soviet trade functions. These systems include the American 
system, the Soviet system, and the international system and 
how they all interact to bring about international trade.
American Trade Formulation
The American system, or infrastructure, of foreign 
commerce with the Soviet Union is a complex set of special 
interest groups, as Connie Friesen explains in The Politics 
of Bast-West Trade:
Accompanying the various twists and turns 
of the trade legislation itself has been 
a broad domestic debate. The protrade 
lobby has included American agricultural 
interests, corporations hoping to sell pro­
ducts to the Soviet Union or to participate 
in Soviet Development projects, and the 
Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture Depart­
ments. It has also included Eximbank and 
large private banks. An antitrade lobby 
has comprised labor groups, and congres­
sional groups, including the administra­
tive arm of Congress, the General Account­
ing Office (GAO).1
These groups, through interaction to further their self- 
interest and needs, formulate the United States international 
trade policies. America's policies of trade with less de­
veloped countries and the East bloc have been to induce the
19
country, through the granting of economic aeeistance, to 
natiens accepting our democratic philosophy or yielding to 
ether areas of our foreign policy, due can develop through 
this understanding of American ideology the problems that 
ean occur when trade is hosed on such a presumption. 
Nevertheless, trade does exist, to whatever the degree. 
Therefore, in the United States there are forces opposed 
and in favor of international trade with the communist 
states. These groups may be divided into governmental end 
privet* advocates and opponents of East-West Trade (see 
Graph 1).
Governmental Proponents of Trade
within the governmental proponents many different 
groups ere jockeying for prominence in achieving their 
goals. The Departments of Commerce, Stats, Defense, end 
Treasury as well as special interest groups nudes up the 
East-West Trade Policy Committee. This committee wee formed 
in the spring of 1973 to redues and raconcile the amount of 
interdepartmental disagreement on policy. Its function is 
to review the major transfers of technology, ell government 
credits for exports above $5.0 million, end to submit a 
quarterly report to Congress on the state of East-West trade. 
A complementary oommittee is the White House's Council on 
International Economic Policy (CIEP), which reports to the 
Administration on East-West trade.
Th« Ear..West Trad* Oecision-Making Process in th« United States
Graph It Taken from Connie M. Freisen, Political Economy 
of Eaat-Weet Trade, p. 26.
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The Bureau of East-West Trade (BEWT), within the De­
partment of Commerce, implements all of the nation's East- 
West trade policies. It also serves as the Executive Secre­
tariat for the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commercial Commission.
The emphasis of the BEWT recently has been pro-trade in 
nature, contrary to the 25 years of negative trade policy 
with the Soviet Union. The bureau is divided into four di­
visions, each divided into sub-offices governing a different 
aspect of international commerce.
Office of Export Administration (Sci­
entific and Electronic Equipment Division,
Capital Goods and Production Materials Di­
vision, Compliance Division, Operations 
Division, ate.);
Offioa of Joint Commission Secretariats;
Office of East-West Tr«.\dn Analysis (Bast- 
west Trade Analysis Division, Beet-Meet 
Trade Policy Division);
Office of East-west Trade Development »
(Eastern European Affairs Division, Peo­
ple's Republic of China and Other Asian 
Areas Division, Trade Development Assis­
tance Division, USSR Affairs Division,
Trade Promotion Division).2
The State Department has three offices which concept­
ualize many aspects of East-West trade development; they 
are: the Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Office of East
European Affairs, and the Office of East-West Trade. The 
primary function of the State Department is international 
political affairs. Since much of the trade involving the 
Soviet Union can be directly attributed to political foun­
dations, its function is well maintained in the formulation 
of trade policies.
The Export-*Import Bank, which controls governmental 
loans and credits, holds a principa position in the devel­
opment of trade policy. Eximbank, like the State Depart­
ment, is concerned with the political affairs of the two 
countries. However, it is torn between wanting to stimu­
late trade loans and credits, thereby increasing its role 
in the decision making process or staying in line with 
American foreign policy. However, the Soviet rejection of 
the Joint Trade Agreement in 1975 because of U.S. inter­
ference in their internal :ffairs with linkage policies, 
caused a reduction in the amount of influence in decisions 
by Eximbank. One such "linkage” policy was the Jackson- 
Vanik Amendment of 1974 which linked trade cooperation 
with the emigration of Soviet Jews. Another concern of 
Eximbank is competition from western Europe's and Japan's 
central banks and other governmental lending institutions. 
They fear that these governmental loans will cause a loss 
of potential business from the Soviet Union and other Eastern 
countries for American industry. Eximbank public relations 
have been exacting in their justifications for trade with 
the Soviets, explaining the benefits from specific deals; 
included in these reports, are overall costs to the U.S., 
environmental aspects, jobs provided, and balance of payment 
advantages. These exacting justifications seem to be a 
method of self-preservation in the wake of controversy of 
loan extension to the Soviets.
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Private Proponents of Trad*
The nongovernmental advocates of trade include, for 
the most part, corporations and large banks, which are ex­
cited at the prospects of opening up a huge untepped market 
for American goods and services. Corporations * such as 
Control Data, dialectically build a strong argument for 
advancing trade with the U.S.S.R. and the East bias. Their 
representatives travel to the Soviet Ohidh developing good 
business relationships with the Soviet Ministry of foreign 
Trade and the respective Foreign Trill ity|4tlittV40|S .
These arguments emphasize that technology ktlttliir, lotoS- 
thing that the U.S. government opposes, on | h||iH||i ||* 
curity basis, can only benefit Amsric§. f^|y ffftm 
technology sold to the Soviets i| of conanercili 
only and has little adaptive military vglmi 
the technology is available from our Western lilies || fSO« 
petitive prices. Therefore, the U.S. is playing ostrieh, 
when ignoring the possibilities of trade. Control lit* oon- 
cludes its view
with respect to business in the Soviet 
Union is the necessity to have tsehne* 
logy flowback, Control Data is inter* 
etted in long-term cooperative ventures 
involving a flew of tsohnoleg, to the 
Unites States . . .  in education end 
madieina.1
Another enticing argument by the corporations, espec­
ially for the government in this time of high unemployment, 
it trade will develop export jobs in the U.S. In continuing
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the protrade argument, the historical pracadanca comas into 
light, the Soviet Union wanta and needs western technology 
and the United States needs raw materials from Siberia's 
vast natural resource reserves, lastly, the corporations' 
dilbUilioh develops ap aesthetic approach. it ootttsndz 
that iftefssfss trade between America and the soviet union 
Will prsmote detents «*4 luff list rsUtions between the ante* 
genistic fetid power a. On* w ay, the corporate executives 
believe this "good will" ean be established is the rein­
statement of KPN status to the Soviets and other communist 
countries. Though corporations have their own self inter­
ests in mind, much lika tha fedaral buraaucracy, they have 
eealisetf that a coahined effort on thair part to promota 
trade would be beneficial. Consequently, the Best-Heat Trads 
Council was established to lobby support for East-Heat trade. 
Because U.S. corporations realize the huge market available 
in the Beet, "the need for capital equipment in the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe will provide a good market for 
U.S. industrial companies for years to coma."1' One must 
decipher these realizations for expended trade as to whether 
they are pursued for private gain or truly in the nation's 
best interest.
Governmental Opponent» of Trade
Governmental opponents of expanding East-Heat trade 
include tha Department of Defense, the General Accounting 
Office (GAO), end Congress. These groups work independently
of each other end oppose trade for different reasons. It 
is a misnomer to say that the Department of Defense is 
against trade with the Soviets: in fact, the official
position of the Department is just the opposite. Needless 
to say, though, much of the governmental opposition to trade 
comes from the Pentagon, especially in the area of technology 
transfer. Recent media accounts cite ten areas that the 
Pentagon believes the Soviet Onion is trying to obtain 
United States' military technology, such as missile guidance 
systems or the Stealth bomber. Therefore, middle-ranked 
officers in the Department, not in tune with the political 
ramifications, worry about the military aspects of technology 
transfer.
The General Accounting Office more fiercely opposes 
East-west trade than any other governmental anti-trade advo­
cate. It sees America as having an unjustified overly lib­
eral trade policy when dealing specifically with the Soviet 
Union. The GAO also has developed its own view of the de­
cision making process in America. While not having a direct 
policy-making role the GAO has strong influence on the actions 
of Congress through its reports and recommendations.
The GAO locates the center of power in 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
the House International Relations Com­
mittee, and the Appropriations committees 
of both houses. Within the executive 
branch, the GAO claims that the CIA, the 
CIEP, the Office of the Special Repre­
sentative for Trade Negotiations, the 
Office of the Management and Budget, and 
the Eximbank are most important. In
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contrast to most governmental agencies, 
the GAO does not concede a major policy­
making force to the Departments of Com­
merce and State.1
While this is a unique view of the policy making process,
Z disagree with the GAO in its estimation. The Departments 
of Commerce and State are the most influential. The reason­
ing supportive of this argument is, the Department of Com­
merce still remains the governmental advocate for industry
e
and big business has a major influence on the propagation of 
U.S. interests. Likewise, the State Department controls the 
political and ideological goals of the U.S. in its affairs 
with foreign governments, and they deem necessary the eco­
nomic policy for America's political relations, it is almost 
certainty to become policy. Again, one can illustrate this 
point with the Carter Administration'a grain embargo against 
Russia which was clearly political in nature.
Congress, as a whole, has remained the most anti- 
Soviet branch of government. Its prolonged aversion to 
dealing with the Soviet Union was defined in the historical 
outline of this paper; this aversion still manifests itself 
in much of Congress' legislation concerning the Soviets. 
Within Congress itself are several committees which concern 
themselves with the many aspects of Soviet-American rela­
tions; these committees are the ones listed in the GAO's 
definition of the policy making process (page 26).
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Private Opponent* of Trade
There ere a formidable number of anti-trade arguments 
which are supported by the private element in the United 
States. The entire question of the Soviet Union's financial 
risk or credit-worthiness is foremost in the anti-trade con­
troversy. The Soviets' default on the Lend-Lease of world 
War XI and the refusal to pay on the 1972 trade agreement 
have fed the question even more. The Soviets are also suf­
fering a balance of payments problem because of the incon- 
vertability of the ruble. The critics (most of whom are in 
academiai economists and political scientists) also argue 
against technology transfer. Connie Friesen has developed 
a coherent series of arguments against technology transfer.
1) the assumption the Soviets lag behind 
Western technology
2) the assumption that U.S. technology 
would be useful to the Soviet economy
3) any major transfer of technology would 
enhance Soviet military capability
4) the U.S. allies will provide whatever 
it won't
5) the fear that U.S. technology will be 
purchased in unpredictable and changing 
amounts, disrupting the U.S. economy
6) tear that the U.S. government lacks 
control over sales of technology.*
There is no argument with the first point, in most areas 
the Soviets are far behind the United States in technology. 
"Xn 1974 they purchased two ammonia plants from Chemical 
Construction Company similar to what they had purchased from 
the same company in 1932." As Marshall I. Goldman, pro­
fessor of economics at Wellesley College points out, "The
Soviet Union's failure to duplicate such technology in the 
interim meant that for 40 years the Soviet Economy was de­
nied the products that this technology could have provided."6 
The second argument, also cannot be denied, for simply the 
Soviets (as well as the rest of the world) now realise the 
benefits of having a highly technologically advanced economy. 
The third argument concerning military advancement to the 
Russians due to Western technology is the strongest argument 
against trade. However, a recent study by the National Se­
curity symposium showed that in several areas the Soviets 
are more advanced than the West (see Appendix 1). The 
argument of the allies reaping the benefits of our "fears" 
to export to the communists has become a self-evident truth. 
The fears of the Soviets disrupting the United States' econ­
omy through unstable purchasing of goods are unfounded. The 
Soviets have a centralised economy which is based on a sys­
tem of precise 5-year and annual plans, any unstable or un­
planned purchases would be more disruptive to their own 
economy than to the U.S. The restrictions and licensing of 
exports in the interest of national security should be 
enough of an answer to the critics of lack of U.S. controls 
or, technology transfer.
The final argument, and perhaps the hardest to resolve, 
is the issue of whether trade and detente have a causal re­
lationship. Trade in and by itself does not cause peace or 
detente, but rather it develops a line of communication be­
tween the two countries. The inflow and outflow of information
in this systsm dearly maintains a dialogue, which in turn 
may lead to a lessening of tensions and detente.
Summary
To conclude, the American system has developed no set 
process for national decision making in East-West trade.
What exists is the constant infighting though behind the 
scenes between governmental departments and branches formu­
lating a policy somewhat in the same manner as nature's 
"survival of the fittest” rule. (For years the "fittest" 
have been the administration which uses economic influence 
to further its foreign policy. However, the administration 
must heed the opinions of other groups when a strong con­
census exists.) While the private sector lobbies for its 
own self-interests, the entire system of checks and balenaes, 
while being semi-chaotic with the individuals or groups 
showing extreme "tunnel visiondees appear to have direc­
tion and accompliah same goal.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE SOVIET UNION'S TRADE INFRASTRUCTURE
The Soviet Union's system of trade and policy making 
is entirely different to the United States. To understand 
the functions of the Soviet foreign trade system, one must 
comprehend the concept of a centrally planned economy. In 
general, everything in the Soviet Union is owned and oper­
ated by the government. It is controlled through a system 
of plans and goals. These economic plans are dictated by 
the political elite.- the ranking members of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), during meetings of the 
Presidium and the Central Committee. These plans are then 
carried out and implemented by lower governmental levels. 
These economic plans are comprehensive in nature from making 
production schedules, employment, to setting prices; every 
aspect of the economy is pre-planned and often causes un­
natural price levels for commodities. The Soviets also 
have "overfull” employment which causes artificial prices 
and problems of productivity. This is a problem inherent in 
a communist system which does not allow market forces to 
prevail. Some problems of productivity are manifested in 
the lack of incentive to produce, for a* long as the Govern­
ment's plan is met "everything is lust dandy."
Perhaps the simplest presentation for understanding
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th e  S o v ie t  Union*s governm ental in f r a s t r u c t u r e  would be to 
d ia g ra m m a tic a lly  t r a c e  th e  d e c is io n  making p ro c e ss  (See 
graph 2 ) . Most econom ic d e c is io n s  are  co n ce iv e d  w ith in  th e  
P o litb u r o , th e  r u lin g  body o f  th e CPSU, and are  passed down 
fo r  a "ru b b er stamp" r a t i f i c a t i o n  by th e C e n tra l Com m ittee. 
The p lan  i s  then passed to  th e governm ental organ s fo r  im­
p le m e n ta tio n . These o rgan s are th e  C o u n cil o f  M in is te rs  and 
i t s  d i r e c t o r s ,  th e P resid ium . W ithin th e  C o u n cil o f  M in i­
s t e r s ,  th e re  a re  th re e  m ajor groups which are  d i r e c t l y  r e ­
la te d  to  th e  developm ent o f  fo re ig n  tra d e : 1) the S ta te
P lann ing Committees (Gospian) c o o rd in a te  the e n t ir e  economy, 
both  c e n t r a l ly  and r e g io n a l ly ,  2) the S ta te  Committee o f  
S c ie n ce  and T e c iin o lo g y 's  fu n ctio n  i s  to  d evelo p  i t s  name­
sake by w h atever means a v a i la b le ,  which in c lu d e s  th e im port­
a tio n  o f  fo r e ig n  te c h n o lo g y , 3) th e  Committee o f  F oreign  
Economic R e la tio n s  d e a ls  w ith  fo re ig n  tra d e  w ith in  the Ease 
B lo c . These s t a t e  com m ittees a lon g w ith  th e  C o u n cil o f  
M in is te rs  then hand down th e plan to  the M in is try  o f  F oreign  
Tradev T h is  M in istry  does th e l e g a l  paperwork and n e g o t i-  
a t io n s  w ith  n a tio n s  fo r  th e  tra d e  agreem en ts. I t  a ls o  a c t s  
as a gu id an ce and r e g u la t io n  group fo r  th e  F oreign  Trade 
O rg a n iza tio n s  (FTOs) which do the e v e ry  day paperwork fo r  
th e prom otion o f  S o v ie t  fo re ig n  t r a d e . Each o f  th e FTOs 
has a s p e c i f i c  area  o f fo re ig n  tra d e  (such as s t e e l  produc­
tio n ) in  which th ey  are th e s o le  a u th o r ity  fo r  tr a d e . The 
M in is try  o f  Foreign  A f f a i r s  i s  concerned w ith  th e p o l i t i c a l  
id e o lo g y  in  in te r n a t io n a l r e la t io n s .  T h e ir  fu n c tio n  cou ld
The (East-West Trade Decision-Making Process in the Soviet Union
General Secretin  
TotlUi ro
Council of MmUbcrt 
Suu* tomir.iucc
Got plan on
Science and Technc!o:
Com m ittee on 
Koreien
Economic Relation!
MirUatry
of
ForcSpn 
A ffair! •
Ministry of Forelr* Trace
Forriprt *1 n*oc Oresjujutior.s 
f F T ( H '
Industrial r .i  i i t r . - a
i
t<arpe
e.nterprlaea
and
inctesilial 
associations !I
Join* C.S.-USSM coinmnators
Commercial Science a/id 
Teehnoloj-
Agriculture
M nistry of 
Forelpn Trade
Sure Comm^u-e 
c»r,
n^«i Ti-r'-.m if?:*.
M-runry of 
Arrirufure
Graph 2: Taken from Connie M. Freisen, Political Economy
of East-West Trade, p. 55.
35
be compared to  th a t  o f  th e  U nited  S t a t e s '  Departm ent o f  
S t a t e .  W hile n ot w anting t o  be d i r e c t l y  con cerned  w ith  
tra d e  a f f a i r e ,  i t  w i l l  become in v o lv e d  when p o l i t i c a l l y  
n e c e s s a r y . The la r g e  e n t e r p r is e s  and in d u s t r ia l  a s s o c ia t io n s ,  
w h ile  o n ly  h avin g  an a d v is o r y  r o le  in  fo r e ig n  t r a d e ,  lobby 
fo r  t h e i r  own in t e r e s t s  to  th e  M in is try  o f  F o re ign  T rad e.
I t  may be noted th a t  th e se  a s s o c ia t io n s  have a p p ro x im a te ly  
th e  same s ta n d in g , in  term s o f  in f lu e n c e , as th e I n d u s t r ia l  
M in is t r ie s .  The J o in t  U .S .- U .S .S .R . com m issions a re  th e  
f i n a l  l in k  between the two c o u n tr ie s , t h i s  com m ission i s  
d iv id e d  in to  th re e  b a s ic  tra d e  grou p s, one r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  
from each  co u n try  fo r  each  grou p. For th e  U nited  S ta te s  
th e re  a re  th e Com m ercial, S c ie n c e  and T ech n o lo gy , and A g r i­
c u lt u r e ,  fo r  th e  U .S .S .R .,  th e  M in is try  o f  F o re ign  T rad e,
S ta te  Committee on S cie n ce  and T ech n o lo gy, and th e  M in is try  
o f  A g r ic u lt u r e ,  r e s p e c t iv e ly .
The e n t ir e  p ro ce ss  o f  th e  developm ent o f  S o v ie t  For­
e ig n  tra d e  p o l ic y  as w e ll  as  tra d e  i t s e l f ,  i s  d i f f i c u l t  fo r  
American businessm en to  make an a c c u ra te  e s t im a te  o f  th e  
needs o f  S o v ie t  in d u s tr y . In l i g h t  o f  t h i s ,  most b u s in e s s  
t r a n s a c t io n s  a re  i n i t i a t e d  by th e  S o v ie ts  and t h e i r  tra d e  
o r g a n iz a t io n s . The FTOs p la y  th e  most im portant r o le  in  
a rra n g in g  tra d e  w ith  th e W est, th ey  determ ine th e  method o f  
payments w hich, because o f  a la c k  o f  hard c u rre n c y  to  pur­
chase im ports o f  the la c k  o f  c r e d i t s  and lo a n s , may have 
Mscme tendency to  ta k e  th e  b a r t e r  approach t o  fo r e ig n  tra d e  
r a th e r  than to  approach e x p o rt  and im port t r a n s a c t io n s
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c o m p le te ly  in d e p e n d e n t ly .* l There have been numerous c a s e s  
re p o rte d  o f  t h i s  ty p e  o f  t r a n s a c t io n .
Trade Reform
Economic reform  in  th e  S o v ie t  Union i s  a slow  and t e ­
d io u s p r o c e s s , because th e  c e n t r a l  p lan n in g  o f  th e  economy 
i s  such a la r g e  p la n , change i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  b r in g  about 
im m ed ia te ly . Reform has o c c u rre d , though. P r ic e s  which 
are  r e l a t i v e l y  co n sta n t were changed in  1967 (th e f i r s t  tim e 
in  tw e lv e  y e a rs )  and have rem ained b a s i c a l l y  s t a b le  e v e r  
s i n c e . 2 A nother reform  was th e  c o n s o lid a t io n  o f  in d u s tr y , 
in t o  la r g e  in d u s t r ia l  a s s o c ia t io n s .  These a s s o c ia t io n s  
removed some o f  th e  burden o f  c e n t r a l  p lan n in g  by indepen­
d e n t ly  d e c id in g  which f a c t o r y  w i l l  produce what elem ent o f  
th e  in d u s tr y . T - .  was done to  p rev en t d u p lic a t io n  and 
s h o rta g e s  o f  s u p p lie s  in  th e in d u s tr y , th ereb y  making i t  
more e f f i c i e n t .
Problem s in  Trade
There a re  many problem s in  S o viet-A m erican  fo r e ig n  
t r a d e , most o f  which are  cau sed  by th e  S o v ie t s '  c lo s e d  
economy. I n c o n v e r t i b i l i t y  o f  th e  ru b le  i s  th e  m ajor prob­
lem fo r  l im it in g  fo r e ig n  t r a d e , and may be e x p la in e d  in  
term s o f  th e  econom y's o v e r f u l l  employment, re p re sse d  in ­
f l a t i o n ,  ra p id  growth an*.* la c k  o f  p r o d u c t iv i t y .  I n c o n v e r t i­
b i l i t y  can be d e fin e d  a s , a person o r  co u n try  b e in g  u n w illin g  
t o  h o ld  an o th er c o u n tr y 's  c u rre n c y  becau se i t s  v a lu e  i s  not 
s u f f i c i e n t  fo r  th e  p r ic e  l e v e l  demanded by th e  c o u n tr y 's
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goods and services. Therefore ■,.s-.e only currency conversions 
are those which directly equax the amount of incoming for* 
eign currency from exports, because r.o free market for the 
ruble exists. Since this type of situation can usually 
happen only between two countries because no other countries 
will hold the inconvertible currency—this is then called 
bilateralism.
Balance of payment problems, although not present in 
the Soviet Union because of rigid state controls of foreign 
trade; there is little doubt that problems would occur if 
the state moved to an open trade system, for the reasons 
listed above. These problems could be corrected if the 
state would devalue its currency, however that is impossible 
because of the lack of exchange rates in terms of real 
prices. The communist countries could solve this problem 
by exporting commodities below the world price, dumping, 
in exchange for a currency devaluation. They have been 
accused of dumping on numerous occasions by the West and 
faced the retaliation of Western protection tariffs on their 
goods.
Summary
The Soviet economy is a quagmire of bureauc atic in­
decision and stagnation. This problem is also e ^ tended to 
the area of Soviet-American international trade. However, 
gradually the Russian economic situation for foreign trade 
is improving; an example can be seen in its expanded trade
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with western Europe (not necessarily true for the domestic 
economy); perhaps it is bet1 r said that the infrastructure 
for the development of trade is beginning to mature into a 
working system.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE SOVIET AGRICULTURAL SYSTEM AND ITS POLICIES
An a n a ly s is  o f  S o v ie t  a g r ic u lt u r e  and i t s  p o l i c i e s  
p ro v id e  a n e c e s s a ry  in s ig h t  t o  th e  r o le  o f  A m e rica n -S o v iet 
a g r i c u l t u r a l  t r a d e . D e sp ite  th e  e x te n s iv e  amount o f  land 
farmed in  th e  S o v ie t  Union (606 m il l io n  h e c ta r e s  o f  a g r i ­
c u lt u r a l  lan d  o f  which 226 m il l io n  h e c ta r e s  are  c u l t i v a t e d ) , 
which i s  f o r t y  p e rce n t more than th a t  o f  th e  U n ited  S t a t e s . 1 
T h is  i n e f f i c i e n t  and w a s te fu l system  has been th e  fo cu s o f  
S o v ie t  p o l ic y  in  re c e n t y e a r s .  W ithin t h i s  p o l ic y  th e re  
are  f iv e  d is t in g u is h a b le  a re a s  o f  c o r r e c t io n :
1) Making adequate c a p i t a l  a v a i la b le  fo r  
in vestm en t in  a g r ic u l t u r e .
2) A cq u irin g  new te c h n o lo g y  and a p p ly in g  
i t  e f f e c t i v e l y  th rou gh ou t th e  c o u n try .
3) C o rr e c tin g  th e  im balances in  th e r e ­
g io n a l a g r i c u l t u r a l  la b o r  su p p ly  and 
r a is in g  th e low l e v e l  o f  t e c h n ic a l  s k i l l s .
4) C o rr e c tin g  c o n tin u in g  i n e f f i c i e n c i e s  in  
th e o r g a n iz a t io n  and management o f  farm 
w ork. 5
5) Coping w ith  consumer p r e s s u r e s  fo r  more 
and b e t t e r  food and w ith  p re s s u re s  fo r  im­
p ro v in g  r u r a l  l i v i n g  c o n d it io n s .2
T h is  a n a ly s is  w i l l  d em onstrate how th e  S o v ie t  government 
i s  p r e s e n t ly  m aking, a p p ly in g , and c o r r e c t in g  i t s  p o l i c i e s  
in  th ese  f i v e  a r e a s .
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U n t il  r e c e n t ly ,  S o v ie t  h is t o r y  dem onstrated r e l a t i v e l y  
sm all amounts o f  governm ental c a p i t a l  in vestm en t in  a g r i ­
c u lt u r e  in  com parison t o  o th e r  a s p e c ts  o f  sp en d in g, c a u s in g  
s i g n i f i c a n t  problem s in  th e  grow th o f  a g r ic u l t u r e .  The 
econom ic burden through fo rc e d  c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n  th a t  S t a l in  
has im plem ented on th e  S o v ie t  a g ra r ia n  s o c ie t y  caused  th e  
re d u c tio n  o f  o u tp u t in  1950 to  f a l l  below  th e p r e - r e v o lu t i c i  
l e v e l . 3 A f t e r  S t a l i n ’ s d eath  in  1953, th e  S o v ie ts  took  a 
more a c t iv e  r o le  in  s tre n g th e n in g  th e  r u r a l  economy, and 
a g r i c u l t u r a l  o u tp u t ro se  a t  an annual r a te  o f  3.4%. T h is  
cou ld  be compared to  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  r a te  o f  2.0%. However, 
s in c e  1970 a g r i c u l t u r a l  o u tp u t in  th e U .S .S .R . has r is e n  
o n ly  a t  a r a te  o f  1.0% a n n u a lly .4*
The A g r ic u l t u r a l  Economy
E co n o m ica lly , th e  S o v ie t  Union spends more than one- 
f i f t h  o f  i t s  GNP and em ploys o ver 25% o f th e  e n t ir e  la b o r  
fo r c e  in  a g r ic u l t u r e .  The U nited  S ta te s  u t i l i z e s  le s s  than 
4% o f  i t s  GNP and le s s  than 5% o f  the la b o r  fo r c e  in  a g r i ­
c u lt u r e .  B egin n in g in  1965, due to  th e  concern  and need 
fo r  an improved in f r a s t r u c t u r e ,  S o v ie t  c a p i t a l  in vestm en t 
fo r  a g r ic u lt u r e  exceeded  o n e -q u a rte r  o f  th e  n a t io n 's  t o t a l  
c a p i t a l  in v estm e n t, le s s  than th e 20% sp en t in  th e p re v io u s  
d e c a d e .5 These in c r e a s e s  in  t o t a l  ru b le  amounts are " in  
th e e ig h th  ( f iv e - y e a r  plan) in c re a s e d  ( c a p i t a l  in vestm ent) 
to  8 1 .5  b i l l i o n  ru b le s?  in  th e  n in th , to  13 0 .5  b i l l i o n  r u b le s , 
and in  th e  te n th  f iv e - y e a r  p lan  p e r io d , th e y  w i l l  in c r e a s e  
to  170 b i l l i o n  r u b l e s . - 6
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T h is  m assive in f lu x  o f  in v estm en t i s  b e in g  done in  
p a r t  to  im prove th e  d e b i l i t a t e d  in fr a s tr u c tu r e #  which gen­
e r a t e s  many i n e f f i c i e n c i e s  in  th e  p re s e n t system . T h is  
problem  i s  a main con cern  o f  th e  Party# which w rote  a t  i t s  
25th C ongress meeting# ;,th e  in f r a s t r u c t u r e  h o ld s  th e  s o lu ­
t io n  fo r  U .S .S .R . t o p - p r i o r i t y  socioecon om ic p ro b lem s."  
Indeed# t h i s  weak in f r a s t r u c t u r e  ca u se s  much w aste  in  term s 
o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p ro d u cts  t h a t  cannot be brou gh t t o  th» con­
sum er. The S o v ie t  jo u rn al#  Problem s o f  E conom ics# w rote in  
1978# "th e  la c k  o f  hard ro ad s in  r u r a l  a re a s  (th e p re se n t 
le n g th  m eets ro u g h ly  60% o f  th e  minimum requirem ent) r e ­
s u l t s  in  th e  lo s s  o f  a s i g n i f i c a n t  p e rce n ta g e  o f  th e  h a r­
v e s t .  " 7 I t  a ls o  noted  t h a t  o n ly  30% o f  th e  t r u c k s  d e liv e r e d  
a re  in c r e a s in g  f l e e t  s i z e  and th a t  25% o f  th e  n in th -y e a r  
p la n 's  f r u i t  and v e g e ta b le s  were s p o ile d  b e fo re  d e l iv e r y  to  
th e  con su m er.0 C a p ita l  in vestm en t in  a g r ic u lt u r e  can be 
seen as an attem p t by government# in  term s o f  p o licy #  to  
im prove th e w eaknesses o f  th e  in fr a s tr u c tu r e #  th e re b y  
c r e a t in g  a more e f f i c i e n t  and modern system  th a t  can more 
e a s i l y  meet th e  needs o f  both  the p easan t fan n er and the 
urban consum er.
"The p r o d u c t iv i t y  o f  th e  s o i l  can be in c re a s e d  *ad 
in f in itu m ' by th e  a p p lic a t io n  o f  c a p ita l#  la b o r , and s c i ­
e n c e , " 9 w rote K a rl Marx# th e  fa th e r  o f  th e  S o v ie t  system . 
However# b ecau se o f  c l im a te , environm ent# and y e a r s  o f  b a ck ­
w ardness in  a g r i c u l t u r a l  techn ology#  th e  S o v ie ts  had to  
p la y  a ca tch -u p  game in  many d i f f e r e n t  a s p e c ts  o f  a g r ic u ltu r e #
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including technologically advanced mechanization systems to 
new climate resistant wheat hybrids that can withstand the 
harsh Russian weather. The Party's agrarian policy empha­
sizes the consolidation of the material and technical basis 
of agriculture, its industrialization, wide-spread land re­
clamation, and chemicalization.10 Though technology is 
stressed, the advances made have been relatively small:
Notwithstanding these efforts, the level 
of agricultural technology in the USSR 
remains generally below that of other 
industrialized nations, a deficiency that 
coexists with a high level of scientific 
knowledge. Many Soviet agricultural sci­
entists are world reknowned, but the lag 
between their research finding and their 
application continues to be unusually 
long in the USSR.11
Nevertheless, gains have been made in improving the 
Soviet agriculture system, and the credit for them must be, 
in part, given to the Ministry of Agriculture, that organ­
izes and controls the entire agricultural system, from 
agrarian research and management to the education of the 
rural community in secondary and higher educational insti­
tutions.12 This Ministry administers one of the best run 
segments, save the military, of the Soviet economy, despite 
its problems. Present Soviet policy does indicate a strong 
commitment in the realm of agricultural technology. Whether 
it is the need for chemical fertilizers in eastern Siberia, 
better irrigation in the Volga-Ural region of European 
Russia, or the need for hardier grain hybrids in Kazakstan.
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Today more than e v e r , t h is  commitment has become g r e a te r  
and never ex p erien ced  in  th e  S o v ie t  Union.
Im balances in  the la b o r  su p p ly  fo r  a g r ic u ltu r e  are an 
is s u e  o f  p o l ic y  in  th e S o v ie t  Union, s in c e  N ik ita  Khrushchev 
opened the " V ir g in  Lands” in  th e m i d - f i f t i e s ,  la b o r  im bal­
ances have become a s i g n i f i c a n t  problem , both g e o g r a p h ic a lly  
and t e c h n o lo g ic a l ly .  One reason fo r  t h is  problem was th e 
la ck  o f  s a t i s f a c t i o n  in  th e p e a s a n t 's  r u r a l l i f e s t y l e .  T h e ir  
income le v e l  was lower than th a t o f  t h e ir  c o u n te rp a rts , t h e ir  
w ork-days were lo n g e r , and th e amount o f  goods and s e r v ic e s  
a v a i la b le  to  them was much l e s s .  T h e re fo re , a m ig ra tio n  o f  
r u r a l p ea sa n ts  see k in g  th e  " b e t te r  l i f e ” o f  th e c i t y  o c c u r r e d .13 
S o v ie t  p o l ic y  in  response to  t h is  problem has been to  r a is e  
th e  standard  o f  l i v i n g  fo r  the r u r a l worker and to  in c re a s e  
th e amount o f  goods and s e r v ic e s  a v a i la b le  to  them. The 
le v e l  o f  income fo r  farm workers has doubled s in c e  1965, 
w h ile  the p r ic e s  o f consumer goods have remained r e l a t i v e l y  
the same. S e r v ic e s  have a ls o  in c re a s e d , " c u lt u r a l  c e n te r s , 
l i b r a r i e s ,  cinem as, ra d io  anc’ t e le v is io n  are r a p id ly  b e­
coming p a rt o f  h is  e v e ry  day l i f e .  The t r a d i t io n a l  d iv is io n  
between r u r a l- t y p e  goods and c i t y - t y p e  goods has d isa p p e a re d . * lk
E ducation o f  the r u r a l p easan ts i s  a ls o  in co rp o ra te d  
in  t h is  a rea  o f  p o l ic y .  E d u ca tio n a l le v e ls  are  r i s i n g ,  a l ­
though th ey  a re  s t i l l  s u b s t a n t ia l ly  low er in the co u n try s id e  
than in  urban a re a s . C u rren t em phasis on r u r a l youth i s  
w o rk -tra in in g  programs in  a g r ic u lt u r a l  r e la te d  s k i l l s .  The 
Communist P a rty  o f the S o v ie t  Union w rote a t i t s  24th C on gress:
45
Now the typical man of the village ia an 
educated, cultured and well-trained person 
with versatile interests. Incidentally, 
the number of specialists with a higher or 
secondary education in the countryside 
grew 16-fold between 1940 and 1970, and 
now totals 821 thousand.15
In spite of the improvements in the living conditions of 
the rural worker through pensions, higher wages, bonus 
plans, health benefits, housing grants, and paid vacations 
the migration of rural workers seeking the better, easier 
life in the cities continues. And to make matters worse, 
the majority of the persons leaving the country are the 
young, highly trained, highly skilled farm workers who are 
necessary for the system to grow, which is why the reten­
tion and development of rural populations is indeed an em­
phasis issue in current Soviet agrarian policy.16
Administrative Problems
Perhaps the most important goal in the Soviet agri­
culture is that of overcoming the inefficiencies of manage­
ment and the organization of farm work. This highly cen­
tralized agricultural management makes most of the impor­
tant decisions for agriculture in the five-year annual 
plans. These plans encompass every aspect of farm activities, 
from planting and harvesting dates to the size of cattle 
herds on specific farms. The conversion of collective farms 
into state farms appears to be a recent trend in management 
policy because these giant "corporation-type" farms con­
verted to central control to use the economies of scale and
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relatively better technology. However, state farms still 
produce at a level well below the goals they were at first 
given.17
Centralized management, which is resistant to change, 
is one of the fundamental problems within the system. For 
example, the case of Ivan Khudenko, an upper level admini­
strator for the Ministry of Agriculture, developed the 
"link-system" of farming (use of a limited group of speci­
alists in agriculture) that could compete with American 
enterprises. The plan increased production by 20 times in 
the neighboring farms at less relative cost. However, 
Khudenko, while being correct in his assumptions, had proved 
the entire agricultural leadership w’-ong and shortly after 
his results were disclosed, he was arrested on a trumped-up 
charge of stealing state funds and sentenced to six years 
in prison where he died. Cases such as this are not at all 
uncommon. Because resistance to change in upper management 
areas exists, the inefficiencies of the organization are 
causing the reduction of bureaucratic mismanagement and 
"red tape" in agricultural administration. President Brezh­
nev himself considers the agricultural administration to be 
overly complex and has sent down directives ordering the 
reduction of size of this branch of government without 
losing effective central control (see Appendix 1). Addi­
tionally, they are to use economic incentives to spur on 
agriculture, rather than using administrative orders and 
directives.16 The amount of bureaucratic "red tape" has
made Soviet agriculture an ineffective organization and 
has become a major policy issue.
Consumer Satisfaction
Consumer pressures for better food and the improvement 
of rural living conditions is certainly the binding force 
in recent years in all areas of Soviet agricultural poli­
cies. Because pressure has been put on government by the 
rural and urban coimnunities to improve the overall standard 
of living, the amount of consumer satisfaction has grown 
considerably. Although this must be compared to the almost 
absence of a consumer market in the Stalin era, conditions 
in present day U.S.S.R. fell well below the standard of 
living in the United States.
Probably the most emphasized goal in the region of 
Soviet agrarian policy is the improvement of the Soviet diet, 
mostly concerning meat consumption. This consumption is at 
a level which Soviet scientists and doctors consider to be 
inadequate for health standards. This is especially true 
for urban areas because of the lack of a transportation in­
frastructure to deliver the meat. Therefore, diets tend to 
be better in the countryside because the food available is 
supplemented by the private household plots. The private 
plots are unique because they produce over thirty percent 
of the total cultivated land. However, more important than 
how much they produce is what they produce, because almost 
fifty percent of the high utility goods goes to the consumer,
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i.e., eggs, milk, meat, fresh fruits and vegetables.19 
This improvement in the diet is the central reason for the 
recent Soviet-American grain trade and because of these 
new goals, Soviet agriculture has been unable to produce 
enough grain to maintain livestock herds to meei these re­
quirements . D. Gale Johnson, Professor of Economics at the 
University of Chicago, says, "If relatively high average 
Soviet grain yields of recent years have been due to favor­
able weather, a return to more nearly average weather would 
place some additional strains on the Soviet economy. The 
Soviet Union would have to import considerably more grain 
and other feed materials than it has since 1971 or reduce 
the consumption of meat."20 Therefore, this commitment to 
the consumer is the sole basis for the "feed grain" trade 
between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Summary
It is evident through this section's analysis that 
when Soviet agricultural policy is at issue, the overwhelming 
concern in all areas of discussion is the commitment to the 
betterment of rural living conditions and the increased 
satisfaction of the consumer.
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CHAPTER FIVE
SOVIET-AMERICAN GRAIN TRADE
The Nixon-Brezhnev Moscow summit meeting in May 1972, 
considered the beginning of the era of detente, moved trade 
into a period which may be described as positive. The 
summit meeting produced a basic set of agreed principles 
for relations between the countries. The seventh principle 
of the agreements specifically pertained to international 
commerce,
the United States and the Soviet Union 
regard commercial and economic ties as 
an important and necessary element in 
strengthening of their bilateral rela­
tions and thus will actively promote 
the growth of such ties. They will fa­
cilitate cooperation between the rele­
vant organizations and enterprises of 
the two countries and the conclusion of 
appropriate agreements and contracts, 
including long-term ones.1
This led to the signing of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Trade 
Agreement in October 1972, which was actually a series of 
agreements, such as environmental protection, space cooper­
ation, and other joint ventures. The major obstacle in 
signing the agreements was the settlement of the Soviets' 
World War II Lend-Lease debts. The issue was settled when 
the Soviets agreed to pay $722 million in annual install- 
rants of $24 million until the year 2001 and America offered
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to  r e in s t a t e  MFN s t a t u s  by 19 75,
G reat G rain  Robbery
Between th e s e  two agreem ents was th e  1972 R ussian 
g r a in  p u rch a se , o fte n  r e fe r r e d  t o  as  th e  "G reat G rain Rob* 
b e r y ."  A lthough th e g r a in  purchase was not d i r e c t l y  r e ­
la te d  to  th e  o th e r  agreem en ts, th e  g e n e ra l e a s in g  o f  te n ­
s io n  promoted th e  agreem ent. T h is  p u rch ase o f  g ra in  was not 
c o n tr a r y  to  p re v io u s  (J .S .-U .S .S .R . tra d e  agreem en ts. The 
S o v ie ts  had s e v e r a l  tim e s b e fo re  c o n tra c te d  g ra in  s a le s  
from Am erica when o th e r  g r a in  e x p o rtin g  n a t io n s , i . e . ,
Canada, A u s t r a l ia ,  A rg e n tin a , e t c . ,  were unable to  f u l f i l l  
th e  S o v ie t  q u o tas fo r  t h a t  p e r io d . The g r a in  p u rch ases o f  
1964 and 1971 bought 1 .8  m ill io n  and 3.0 m il l io n  tons j f  
g r a in , r e s p e c t i v e ly ,  from th e U nited  S t a t e s . 2
The 1972 G reat G ra in  Robbery was d i f f e r e n t  because o f  
th e  m agnitude o f  th e  p u rch a se , 19 m il l io n  to n s  o f  g ra in  a t  
a c o s t  o f  $ 1.2  b i l l i o n .  T h is  was to  supplem ent th e  S o v ie t  
poor h a rv e s t  in  th a t  y e a r .  The agreem ent which was sig n ed  
J u ly  8, 19 72 , p ro v id e d  th a t  th e  U .S . would g ra n t through 
th e  Commodity C r e d it  C o rp o ra tio n  $750 m ill io n  o f  f in a n c in g  
fo r  U .S .S .R . g ra in  p u rch a se s . A ls o , i t  p ro v id e d  th a t  the 
U .S .S .R . would purchase t h i s  g r a in  in  a p e r io d  from August 1 ,  
19 72 , through J u ly  3 1, 19 7 5 3 (see  Appendix 3 ) . T h is  a g re e ­
ment l u l l e d  th e  U nited S t a t e s  in to  u n d e re stim a tin g  th e So- 
v i e t  U n io n 's  needs (b ecau se o f  t h e i r  poor h a r v e s t)  and 
a llo w ed  them to  p u rch ase much more g r a in  than th e  agreem ent
provided at bargain prices. This drew c r i t i c i s e  wpcm th e  
U. S. and the Department of Agriculture for the mmmgzmg of 
this fiasco. Immediately many changes were in tro d u ced  to 
control grain exports. One such change was th e  re g  i rm e n t  
that al] U.S, grain exporters report to the Department of 
Agriculture, within 24 hours, all foreign grain purchases 
over 100,000 tons. "This was to prevent a recurrence of 
the 1972 scenario in which Moscow’s negotiators worked so 
discreetly that competing U.S. grain dealers . . . were un­
aware of what was happening. Moreover, key government agen­
cies discovered , . , that federal s u b s id ie s  were c o n tr ib u ­
ting to the bargain purchases by Exporthleb."u (E xp orth leb  
is the Soviet grain purchasing organization.)
There were also complaints about the workings of the 
new system of detente. The complaints cantered around the 
possibility that detente did not serve U.S* economic inter­
ests. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger# tried to dis­
associate the grain purchases with the month earl er Moscow 
summit,
f he Soviet grain deal, whatever criticism 
may be made of it, had neiit to nothing to 
do with detente . . .  at the Moscow summit 
there was next to no discussion of the 
gram deal because the assumption at that 
time was that the amount of purchases 
would be so low as to not justify the at­
tention of the two national leaders#*
The economic cost of the agreement to the U.S, was 
very high. The Soviet Union bought a majority of the grain
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by ft U nited s t a t e s  loan gu aran tee o f  $750 m illio n  a t a sub­
s id iz e d  in t e r e s t  r a te  o f  6-1/8% through th e CCC. $300 m il­
l io n  in a d d it io n a l su b sid y  c o s t s ,  from th e  fe d e r a l go vern ­
ment, to  the g ra in  e x p o rte r s  was a ls o  tagged  onto th e  t o t a l  
lo s s .  These s u b s id ie s  were preven ted  by Congress s h o r t ly  
a f t e r  th e  r e a l i z a t io n  o f  what th e S o v ie ts  had p u lle d  o f f . 6
In th e wake o f  S o v ie t  con du ct, Congress passed  a s e r ­
ie s  o f  b i l l s  usin g  the id ea o f  lin k a g e , the use o f  t r a d e o f fs  
fo r  a c h ie v in g  c e r t a in  g o a ls .  In 1974, S en ator Henry Jackson 
and R e p re se n ta tiv e  C h a rles  Vanik used lin k a g e  in a b i l l  to  
l in k  to g e th e r  East-W est tra d e  and S o v ie t  in te r n a l p o l i c i e s .  
The Jackson -V anick  Amendment provided  th a t  the U .S. would 
g ran t b e t te r  tra d e  c o n d itio n s  provided  th a t  th e S o v ie ts  met 
a c e r t a in  e m ig ra tio n  quota o f  Jews from t h e ir  c o u n tr y .7
S h o r tly  b e fo re  the 1975 g ra in  purch ases and th e  g ra in  
agreem ent the S o v ie ts  an n u lled  the 1972 J o in t  Trade Agreement 
(in  January 19 7 5 ) . There were s e v e r a l reason s fo r  th e  an­
nulm ent, f i r s t  th e  va lu e  o f  th e agreement to  the R ussians 
was s i g n i f i c a n t l y  reduced due to  th e r i s e  in world go ld  and 
o i l  p r ic e s .  S eco n d ly , Jackson-V anik amendment appeared to  
o v e rs t ep th e bounds o f  S o v ie t  to le r a n c e  in U.S.  m eddling in  
t h e i r  d om estic a f f a i r s *  F in a l l y ,  the l im it s  on c r e d i t s  to  
th e  S o v ie ts  removed th e b e n e f i t s  o f  th e  MFN s t a t u s .  P r e s i­
dent Ford t r i e d  to  keep th e  tra d e  agreem ent a l iv e  but 
the reeolwe wee lo s t  in  the e le c t io n  y e a r  p o l i t i c s . 3
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1975 Grain Agreements
Many of the 1972 grain purchase errors were simply re­
peated in the grain agreements of 1975. The Department of 
Agriculture once again, despite the amount of contrary in­
formation, grossly underestimated the severity of the Soviet 
crop failures (which were 85 million tons less than in 1976). 
It took several weeks for the U.S. to realize that the So­
viets were once again purchasing massive amounts of Ameri­
can grain. In the last two weeks of July 1975 the Soviets 
contracted to purchase over 9.8 million tons of grain. These 
large purchases subsequently led to the Longshoremen's boy­
cott and refusal to load American grain bound for the So­
viet Union. The President was consequently forced to sus­
pend all grain sales to the Soviet Union until the signing 
of the five-year grain agreement on October 20, 1975 (see 
Appendix 4). The agreement called for the Soviet purchase 
of 6 million tons of grain each year with a 2 million ton 
optional purchase. It also provided the U.S. with an escape 
clause if there was a crop failure.9
This five-year agreement received much applause in the 
United States because it prohibited the Soviets from making 
sporadic purchases and disrupting the market. The agree­
ment was negotiated by Undersecretary of State for Economic 
Affairs Charles W. Robinson instead of Department of Agri­
culture Secretary Earl Butz. This was a setback to the De­
partment of Agriculture because it removed some of their 
power in foreign trade policy implementation.10 Farm groups
throughout the country supported the agreement because of 
the stability it introduced into the market. However- they 
disliked the governmental intervention in prohibiting a 
free market situation.
The Soviet-American grain trade wee relatively a sta­
ble process in the interim years between the 1975 grain 
trade agreement and tho five-year agreement and the fact 
that the Soviet Union had basically stable harvest yields 
and had no need for massive grain imports to supplement 
their quotas.
The Grain Embargo
President Carter's imposition on January 4, 1980, of 
a grain embargo is the final element in the series of the 
American-Soviet grain trade. During the end of December in 
1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan to protect their 
national interest. There has been much speculation on the 
reasons of the invasion, but it is enough for this paper to 
accept the invasion, whatever the reasons. President Carter, 
in justifying the embargo said "[the] Soviets should not be 
allowed to undertake such an act with impunity." And "it's 
the [the invasion] greatest crisis since Second World War."11 
Howevet. the goals that were to be achieved by this embargo 
have been uncertain. Certainly the time was prime for a 
grain embargo, the previous harvest of the Soviet Union fell 
far below the set goal (48 million tons or 21 percent). The 
Soviet Union had to import an all-time record amount of
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grain (35 million tons) to prevent a severe reduction in 
livestock herds. The United States was to supply by far 
the largest portion of the imports, 25 million tons in all, 
this in the advent of a record breaking United States harvest. 
In addition, the rest of the world was suffering from pro- 
duction/supply bottlenecks and seemed unlikely to export 
the amount of gtain the Soviets needed.12
Nevertheless, the internal effects on the Soviet Union 
probably were not the only reasons for the embargo. As a 
matter of fact, it is most likely that the administration 
knew it would not have the intended effect.
For the embargo to have the intended effect three con­
ditions had to be fulfilled. First, the United States must 
have been able to control the end market for their grain 
sales. Second, the United States must have been able to 
prevent the "leakage" of grain from other countries. Finally, 
the United States had to be sure the effect on the Joviets 
would have been severe enough to make them leave Afghani­
stan. One other reason was possibly that the United States 
felt stymied by the courses of action available to the in­
vasion. Clearly Afghanistan was not in the United States 
sphere of influence, especially after the loss of Iran as 
an ally. The Adm,.:.) stration felt that the only recourse was 
the embargo, which was definitely the strongest action avail­
able at that time.13
To prevent domestic outcry from the embargo when 
Carter announced the stoppage of seventeen million tons
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already contracted for, the Department of Agriculture an­
nounced that the Commodity Credit Corporation would assume 
all contractual obligation. The United States still hon­
ored the 1975 trade agreement and permitted the sale of 
3 million tons of grain. The ploy seemed to work as Carter 
won the Iowa (the major grain-producing state) caucuses by 
a 2-1 margin.
The domestic costs, at least during that of the em­
bargo were quite exaggerated, as a matter of fact it was re­
ported that to the United States were nonexistent. The ex­
port market had in fact a slight increase over the previous 
fiscal year (see Appendix 5a). However, there was a slight 
depression of grain prices during the summer of 1980 due to 
the release of government owned grain supplies into the mar­
ket. The entire costs to the United States were borne in 
the short run by the federal government which purchased the 
export contracts for $3.0 billion. The expenses were to be 
recovered when the government sold the grain back r-i the 
market.
The question remains over the embargo is whether or 
not it should have been maintained for so long. Clearly the 
Soviet Union did not suffer enough to accomplish the goals 
intended by the United States, they still occupy Afghanistan 
and with a greater deal control over the domestic population 
than before. In all the embargo prevented the Soviets from 
purchasing approximately 3.5 million tons of grain, although 
some estimates are as high as 6.0 million tons which the 
United States could have easily supplied. However, one
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cannot discount the fact that the costs of grain were 
higher to the Soviets who still do not have enough hard 
currency. The effect on the Russian meat supply also did 
not occur. The Soviet livestock herds grew by 640,000, 
though at a slowed growth rate. Also, America's allies did 
not wholeheartedly support the embargo, records show that 
they increased their exports to the Russians when the 
American market dried up (see Appendix 5b).llf
Since President Reagan lifted the embargo the long 
run effects of the embargo on the American economy have 
come to light. It has been reported that the costs were a 
net loss of $22.0 billion and 120,000 jobs. Clearly, these 
costs, given the intended effect of the embargo by Presi­
dent Carter, were not at all justified. It is my belief, 
as well as many experts, that for the United States to im­
pose agricultural sanctions the three conditions previously 
mentioned must be met. Then and only then ca> America take 
advantage of its greatest commodity.
Summary
Through this case study of the American-Soviet grain 
agreements, it has been clearly shown that American foreign 
trade policies in regard to Soviet grain purchases have 
oscillated from strict control to being overgenerous. This 
may be compared to the similarly confused and unstable pro­
cesses of detente. In the beginning of the era, trade pol­
icy was conciliatory towards the Soviet Union. However,
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after the "Great Grain Robbery" of 1972 strict restrictions 
were enforced on agricultural exports in response to domes­
tic pressures. It can be concluded from the responses to 
the issues that United States agricultural foreign trade 
policy is developed in complex interactions between special 
interest groups.
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CHAPTER SIX
U.S. TRADE POLICY IMPLICATIONS
There ere real reasons, such as war or an attack on 
our allies, for America to impose any economic sanctions 
on the Soviets on the grounds of national security and 
economic problems. However, these reasons a n  seldom the 
issue at hand when trade sanctions have been imposmd by 
America. The following section of this paper will analyze 
the reasons and issues (mostly political in nature) of 
America's economic sanctions.
An analysis of Soviet-American international commerce 
since the beginnings of detente has shown a basic flaw in 
America's beliefs and policies. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment 
of the Trade Reform Act of 1974 clearly illustrates a mis­
conception in what the limits of detente are or should con­
tain. The "linking" of Soviet Jew emigration quotas to fa­
vorable economic treatment and the granting of Most Favored 
Nation status in trade to the Soviet Union is a gross mis­
calculation on how to influence Russian domestic policy 
(not to mention what is not in our sphere of influence).1
It should be emphatically stated that the United 
States is wrong to assume that favorable or unfavorable eeo- 
nomic treatment of the Soviets should be tied to internal 
situations or policies when they do not directly concern
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our n a tio n a l s e c u r i t y  or i n t e r e s t s .  T h is  i s  not to  sa y  tfcftt 
v io la t io n s  o f human r ig h t s  should  be ig n o re d , but r a th e r ,  
change i s  to  be implemented through o th e r  means such as 
through the U nited N ations or by p u b lic  c h a stise m e n t. In 
a d d it io n , the U nited  S ta te s  co n ce p tio n s o f d e te n te  should 
not be so a m b itio u s. D etente should  be concerned p r im a r ily  
w ith  th e s t a t e  o f  S o viet-A m erican  b i l a t e r a l  r e la t io n s  and 
not th e c o u n t r ie s 1 p h ilo s o p h ic a l and id e o lo g ic a l  d i f f e r e n c e s .
In support o f  t h is  argum ent, h is t o r y  has dem onstrated 
q u ite  th e o p p o site  in the S o v ie t  U n ion 's r e a c t io n s  when th e  
U nited S ta te s  has imposed economic s a n c tio n s . For exam ple, 
S t a l i n 's  r e s o lv e  to  m aintain  h is  c o n tro l o ver the E ast b lo c  
a f t e r  World War I I  i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  by h is  r e fu s a l  to  a c c e p t , 
in  1947, the M arsh all Plan fo r  th e  r e c o n s tr u c tio n  o f  Europe. 
The P lan would have gran ted  Am erica c o n s id e ra b le  in f lu e n c e  
in  how th e  money was to  be s p e n t .2 By doing so , S t a l i n  
a cce p te d  th e  fa te  o f  m ill io n s  o f  S o v ie t  c i t i z e n s  s u f fe r in g  
and d yin g  because o f  s ta r v a t io n  due to  th e la c k  o f American 
a id .
^he S o v i e t s ' response to  th e Jacksori-Vanik amendment 
and th e Trade Reform Act i s  y e t  another example o f  A m e rica 's  
m is in te r p r e ta t io n  o f  d e te n te . The S o v ie t  r nion in  1975 
an n u lled  th e  1972 U .S .-U .S .S .R . J o in t  Trade Agreement which 
had been so la b o r io u s ly  n e g o tia te d  and sign ed  on O ctober 18, 
1972. T h is  agreem ent which was sought a f t e r  by both n a tio n s  
fo r  th e  developm ent o f  b e n e f i c i a l  tra d e  com m odities and 
r u le s  by which a l l  tra d e  was to  be govern ed . The annulment
o f th e agreem ent and r e fu s a l  to  con tin u e payment o f  t h e ir  
Lend-Imase o b lig a t io n s  o f  World War I I  (a ls o  s e t t le d  under 
th e  agreement) caused th e  S o v ie ts  to  fo re g o  the p o s s i b i l i t y  
o f  MFN s ta tu s  from th e U .S. Hie c u rta ilm e n t in  the amount 
o f  S o v ie t  Jews who were a llo w ed  to  em igrate  su b seq u en tly  
fo llo w ed  the Amendment a lso *  3
T h is t h e s is  through exam ples o f  h i s t o r i c a l  and con- 
tem pcrary e v e n ts  has shown c l e a r l y  th a t th e S o v ie t Union 
w i l l  not t o le r a t e  th e  in te r fe r e n c e  o f  economic sa n c tio n s  
imposed by the U nited S ta te s*  T h is paper does not deny the 
r ig h t s  o f  th e U nited  S ta te s  to  respond to  S o v ie t  a c t s  o f  
a g g r e s s io n , v io la t io n s  o f human r ig h t s ,  or th r e a ts  to  th e 
in te r n a t io n a l  b a lan ce  o f  power th a t  a s s a u lt s  world peace* 
N e v e rth e le s s , I b e l ie v e  th e  U nited S ta te s  must r e c o n s tr u c t  
i t s  v iew s on tra d e  w ith  th e  S o v ie t  Union under the a u sp ic e s  
o f  d e te n te . The fo llo w in g  s e c t io n s  o f  t h i s  paper w i l l  de­
v e lo p  an id e o lo g ic a l  b a s is  fo r  fu r th e r in g  S oviet-A m erican  
tra d e  under d e te n te .
P o lic y  Recommendations
In ord er fo r  America to  e n jo y  a w orkable tra d e  p o lic y  
w ith  R u ssia , g e n e ra l changes must be made in  t h e ir  p e rce p ­
t io n s  o f d e te n te . F i r s t  th e U nited S ta te s  must r e - e v a lu a te  
t h e i r  g o a ls  o f  d e te n te  and what the l im it s  o f d e te n te  &an 
r e a l i s t i c a l l y  in c lu d e . In o th e r  words, th e  U nited S ta te s  
must a cce p t the f a c t  th a t t h e ir  am bitions fo r  d e te n te  are 
too  b road . D etente does not in c lu d e  the a b i l i t y  to  in flu e n c e
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change of ideological difference* within the domestic/in- 
temel policies of the Soviet Union. Consequently, Ameri­
can* cannot expect much more from detente than the hopes 
that any bipolar confrontation will be held in check and 
not escalated into nuclear war. This is the most pressing 
change for American policy-makers to accept, for without it 
detente will oscillate, as it has done throughout its 
existence. To summarize, American international policies 
for detente must be to establish order first and place 
systemic change second.
In extending the United States overall change in their 
views on detente, the U.S. must realize the different area* 
within detente. There are three major categories into 
which agreements of detente can be divideds political, 
military, and economic. If the United States is to make 
any headway in the continuance of detente it must disassoci­
ate the three categories as much as possible and not set 
one against the other. In other words, political or mili­
tary disagreements should remain independent of the present 
economic relationship and vice versa. Also the status of 
one category should not be changed to effect the status of 
the other in order to make the situation more favorable. 
Therefore, in the area of economic detente, crisis problems 
should be directly confronted and not manipulated into 
change by other means.
The second change for the continuance of detente and 
the development of bilateral trade is the creation of a true
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global economy. The United States should, with the Soviet 
Union, press for the cooperation of Western Europe (the EEC) 
and Japan, as well as the East bloc (CEMA) in the establish­
ment of this world economy. The objectives of such an econ­
omy would maintain a stable international situation, there­
by preserving peace. This international economy would pro­
mote interdependence among nations and establish a favorable 
line of communication between the antagonistic nations cre­
ating more understanding of each other.1*
The third proposed change for the United States pol­
icy-makers is the development, with the Soviet Union, of 
private and public institutions, such as the joint U.S.- 
U.S.S.R. commissions, to maintain control of the everyday 
functions of detente and foreign commerce. It cut be 
through these organizations that problems of detente might 
be solved. The infrastructure for this proposal has already 
been established. The national governments of America and 
Russia, the bureaucracies, international organizations such 
as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), corporations, inter­
governmental commissions such as the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint 
Trade Commissions in Science and Technology, Commerce, and 
Agriculture, and other national organizations involved in 
East-West trade. What is lacking in this framework is the 
necessary guidelines which will establish, regulate, and 
further develop trade under detente.
These insti .utions will have to provide in their
policies room for entanglement as well as disengagement.
For it must be possible for each party to be able to remove 
themselves from the policies of areas in which they feel 
threatened or manipulated. The reasoning behind this is to 
establish a "free will” or open markets in international 
commerce and remove the rigidity that compromises the fur­
therance of detente.
The guidelines and regulations that promote this pro­
position are rather simple but will take coneiderable effort 
to implement. American foreign trade policies with the So­
viets should allow the business of trade to be conducted on 
a "normal" basis. The normalization of trade will provide 
for the United States and the Soviet Union a pragmatic way 
of approaching trade rather than a political/ideological 
method. For example, the Soviet's foreign trade organization 
(FTOs) would be allowed to contact United States exporters 
of commodities desired, then without governmental interfer­
ence conduct trade in a manner that is similar to America's 
trade with their allies. It is understood that there must 
be regulations of trade with the Soviets. However, the 
governmental interference and restrictions will be based on 
national security areas such as the transfer of military or 
high technology and not on a political basis such as a grain 
embargo. In addition, the normalization will also provide 
the room for entanglement or disengagement much like normal 
business affairs which are controlled by the necessity of 
supply and demand.
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If trade is conducted on such a normal basis the 
ramifications on detente can only be positive. Trade which 
is free of political considerations will further the feeling 
of goodwill between the two superpowers. This is not to 
say that economic situations, such as balance of payment 
problems or credit extensions, will be taken lightly or 
ignored. In such a situation the overall incentive to con­
tinue those feelings will most probably negate any negative 
feelings or problems. And ideologically economic interde­
pendence will develop because of the mutual needs and 
understandings of both nations.
The needs of the Soviet Union in trade with the United 
States are vast. First and foremost the need of American 
technology such as computer soft and hardware is most im­
portant in the Soviets' purchases. The Soviets have not 
been able to develop the technology they need for several 
reasons. First the devastation of two World Wars and a 
civil war (the revolution) in the last fifty-odd years 
caused the Soviet economy to start over, virtually from 
scratch. The second reason is the historical backwardness 
of the development of Soviet technology. Third is the prob­
lem inherent in the infrastructure of the economy in its 
ability to increase productivity and development. Finally, 
and porhaps most importantly, the economic sanctions and 
restrictions imposed on trade with the Soviets by America 
and the West since the end of World War II.5
Needless to say there are available commodities which
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may be of interest to the United States in trading with 
the Soviet Union. They consist mainly of the vast natural 
resources of Russia such as oil, natural gas, and minerals. 
However, this may not be the most important or beneficial 
reason for trade with the Soviets. If the Soviet payment 
problems could be solved, the United States could establish 
a trading partner who would help in their own balance of 
payments deficits. The possibilities of economic benefits 
in trade with Russia are immense; more jobs, increased output, 
and exports are only a few of the potential bonuses. If for 
any reason the United States develops trade with the Soviets, 
these reasons should provide enough incentive.6 As has 
bean shown, the potential benefits of normalizing trade 
under detente with the Soviet Union are immense, especially 
in agricultural trade. From an American viewpoint, casting 
aside political and ideological differences, the economic 
reasons for expanding international trade with the Soviets 
are alone very convincing. Granted that some may argue 
against trade because of Russia's economic instability. 
However, this paper is not advocating an irrational jump 
into trade, but rather a calculated implementation of well 
planned policy.
The Realities of Interdependence
Before concluding this essay there should be a brief 
discussion on the limits and realities of such proposed 
economic detente policies becoming America* s international
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tra d e  p o l ic y  w ith  th e  S o v ie t  U nion. Much o f  the argument 
in  t h i s  paper has in v o lv e d  in terd ep en d en ce and i t s  r a m if i ­
c a t io n s .  I t  has been argued th a t  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a 
s t a b le  in terd ep en d en t b i l a t e r a l  r e la t io n s h ip  between th e  
U nited  S ta te s  and th e  S o v ie t  Union becau se o f  t h e ir  le a d in g  
r o le s  in  w orld  a f f a i r s  w i l l  promote w orld  peace and under­
s ta n d in g , T h is  g o a l i s  th e u lt im a te  hope o f  t h is  th e s is ?  
how ever, i t  must be c l a r i f i e d  th a t  th e  s e p a r a tio n  o f  e c o ­
nomic d e te n te  w i l l  not n e c e s s a r i ly  cau se any changes in  th e 
o th e r  a re a s  o f  d e te n ts .
The reality that these goals will be accomplished also 
is doubtful gives th s  present state of America's decision- 
making process. The sem i-chaotic method of domeetic policy* 
makers can w e ll be extrapolated into the realm of eeomestia 
detente and the foreign trade policies requirements* H e  
season for m ssrican  pelicy-seking chaos is that the 
visionM of special interest groups and lobbies trying to 
in f lu e n c e  a  b ig g e r  p o rtio n  o f  the p ie  causes an uneven dis­
t r ib u t io n  m th e  developm ent o f  trade policy. It can be 
compared to  n a tu r e 's  r u le  o f "survival of th e  fittest. * 
Perhaps th e  g r e a te s t  problem w i l l  .be the reaswra! and saps-* 
r a t io n  o f  econom ic d e te n te  from p o l i t i c a l  d e te n te  and i f  
t h i s  is to  be ach ieved  American le a d e r s  w i l l  have tc make 
a com plete r e v e r s a l  in  p re se n t p o l ic y  a t t i t u d e s .
A lthough t h i s  paper has been lim ite d  to  Am erican- 
S o v ie t  tra d e  th e problem s o f  th e EEC and CEMA cause to  
American p o licy -m a k e rs  must be r e c o n c ile d . The U nited
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S t a t e s  must r e a l i z e  th a t  W estern Europe has a lr e a d y  d e v e l­
oped t i e s  w ith  th e  S o v ie ts  and th e E ast b lo c .  The n a tu ra l 
gas l in e  under c o n s tr u c t io n  from S ib e r ia  co n n ectin g  W estern 
Europe w ith  th e  S o v ie t  Union and E ast b lo c  has been done in ­
dependent o f  A m e rica 's  w is h e s . T h e r e fo r e , Am erica must 
p r e s s  fo r  econom ic co o p e ra tio n  between th e  n a t io n s , and 
th e re b y  c r e a t e  tra d e  p o l i c i e s  th a t  are  in  co n ju n ctio n  w ith  
each  o th e r  by fo llo w in g  a s e t  o f  e s t a b lis h e d  g u id e lin e s  and 
r u le s .  In doing so , th ey  w i l l  g e n e ra te  a s ta b le  g lo b a l 
economy th a t  f r e e l y  p erm its  m u l t i la t e r a l  tra d e  and c o n c e iv ­
a b ly  la y s  th e  fo u n d a tio n s o f  g lo b a l  d e t e n t e .7
Conclusions
These proposed changes o f  U nited  S ta te s  p o l i c i e s  o f  
tr a d e  w ith  th e  S o v ie t  Union a re  n e c e ssa ry  i f  an econom ic 
r e la t io n s h ip  o f  any consequence i s  t o  be e s t a b l is h e d .  But 
in  o rd e r  fo r  t h i s  to  happen th e U nited  S t a t e s  wmmt fo llo w  
th e s e  p la n s  o f  r e - e v a lu a t in g  t h e i r  id e a ls  o f  d e te n te , b e­
come aware o f  th e  d i f f e r e n t  and s e p a ra te  a re a s  o f  d e te n te , 
d e v e lo p  a g lo b a l economy, and c o n s tr u c t  a new framework and 
g u id e lin e s  f o r  economic in t e g r a t io n  as w e ll  as th e n o rm ali­
z a t io n  o f  r e l a t i o n s . 8
In summation, th e  fu tu r e  o f  p o s i t iv e  Soviet--Arnerlean 
econom ic r e la t io n s  i s  dependent cm th e  above changes in  
U nited  S t a t e s  fo r e ig n  tra d e  p o l ic y .  I f  th e se  p o l ic y  
changes a re  fo llo w e d  b i l a t e r a l  commerce w i l l  be p erm itted  
to  become p ragm atic  and "n o rm a l.” However, t h is  n o rm a liza tio n
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s h a l l  be complex and d i f f i c u l t  fo r  Am erica to  im plem ent. 
D etente fo r  Am ericans s t i l l  rem ains th e  b a s t io n  o f  h o p efu l 
am bition s when compared to  th e  e x p e c ta t io n s  found w itftin  
the S o v ie t  e l i t e .  C o n se q u e n tly , Am ericans a re  s t i l l  finding 
d i f f i c u l t y  in d is t in g u is h in g  econom ic d e te n te  from political 
d e te n te . T h e re fo re , I m ain tain  if the U nited States pursues 
th ese  proposed changes there can be no more practical way 
to  generate th e  feelings o f good will between the Soviet 
Union and Am erica. W ithout t h is  goodwill there can b e, to  
r e i t e r a t e  S en ator M ondaie' s exam ple, "no g ra v e r  th re a t  to  
in te r n a t io n a l  stability . . , and to n a tio n a l security i t ­
s e l f . "
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f i C H m O Q Y  A N D  U t  lOVItf C O M P E T I T I O N
RILATIVI U 8 /U8 3 R T E C H N O L O O T  LEVEL (N D E P L O Y E D  
MILITARY S Y S T E M S *
DEPLOYBO «Y#TEM
US
avriMOR
U S - U M A
EQUAL
U t M
s u p e a i o a
STRATEGIC
IC B M X
S S B N / S L B M X*»
Bomber X
SAMs X
S a llla tic  M issile  D efense X
Anti-satellite X
T A C T IC A L
La n a Force*
S A M s  (in c lu d in g  Naval) X
Ta n k s ~ x ##
A rtiilsry X -
Infantry C o m bat V e h icle s X
A n ti-tank  G u id e d  M issile s X
Attack H elicopters X -
C n s m ie a l W srfsrs X
Th e a te r Ballistic M issile s X
Air Forets
Fighter/Attack Aircraft X
A»f*to*Air M issiles X
P G M X
Air Lift X
Naval force*
i
Anti-Submarine Warfare x«*
See baaed A ir X-
Surface Combatant! X
**§**!§*W^lwMYfw X
Mine wiiriitt X
Ampblbimit Assault X-
0*1
Oemmufilealioni X -
Command and Control X
Biaetronle Countermaaaura X
• urvalllsnea and Ptecon-
naisianca X -
Earl* VYarninfl X-
' Tht*» art comoariaon* of »yatam technology leva! only, ino are not ntctisirUy a measure of 
etfectiuenaat the companion* nu  not 4*pand*nt on scenario, tactic*, quantity, training, or 
otnar oparatioi at factor*. System* farther than 1 yaar from IOC art not considered.
* *Thu arrows denote that tha ratativa technology level is changing significantly m the dtrec 
tion indicated
Source, ffct FY t W  Department of Defense Program for Research, Development and Acpw 
niton, Statement by Or William J Parry. USORiE. to the 96th congrsas. 1 February 1990, p
11*37
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AGREEMENT HETWEEN THE GOVERNM! NT Ob TUI UNITED STATUS 
OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET 
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS WITH RESPECT TO PURCHASES OF GRAINS BY 
THE SOVIET UNION IN THE UNITED STATES AND CREDIT TO BE MADE 
AVAILABLE BY THE UNITED STATES
The Government of the United States of America (USAland Govern­
ment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) have agreed as follows:
Article 1
1. The Government of the USA through its Commodity Credit Corpora* 
tion's Export Credit Sales Program hereby makes available a total amount of US 
5750 million credit for Financing the payment for USA grown grains (at buyer’s 
opt ion*-wheat, com, barley, sorghum, rye, oats) purchased by the USSR in the 
USA under this Agreement. Such total amount may be increased by the USA.
2. The USSR through its foreign trade organisations shall purchase from 
private United States exporters not less than US 5750 million port valua of such 
grains (at buyer** option-wheal, corn, barley, sorghum, rye, oats) for delivery 
during the three-year period August 1,1972, through July 7 1.1975, and of such 
amount not leu than US $200 million shall he purchased for delivery prior to 
August 1, 1973 In case of purchases of such grains for cash for delivery during 
the period of August 1, 1972, through July 31,1975, the U S. dollar amount of 
such purchases shall he counted as if they were made on credit terms under this 
Agreement.
3 The following provisions shall apply with respect to the credit referred 
to in Section I of this Article 1.
3.1 It shall continue to be available, if not previously exhausted, for deliveries 
made not later than July 31,1975.
3.2 The total amount of credit outstanding at one time shall not exceed US 
$500 million.
3.3 Delivery for purchases shat! be F.A.S. or F.O.B. port of export and interest 
shall run from date of delivery. The date of delivery shall be the omboard date
__of the ocean bill of lading.
3 4 The principal and interest for credit anting under each delivery shall be 
payable by the USSR as follows: one-third of the principal annually, plus 
accrued interest on the outstanding principal balance to the date of each princi­
pal payment.
3.5 The amount of credit for each delivery will be limited to the Untied S u its  
port value of the commodity, without ocear freight, insurance, o: other charges 
or costs
3.6 The interest rate for purchases under this Agreement for which delivery is 
made not later then March 31,1973, shall he 6*1/8% per annum on that ponton 
of the obligation confirmed by a USA bank. This rate of interest for that pome* 
of Che obligation confirmed by a USA bank shall be applicable during the whole 
three-year period for repayment of the credit which arises under each delivery 
made not later than March 31. p -3
Article 2
This Agreement shell enter into force from the day of its signing and shall 
remain valid until all the obligations anting from it for both sides are fulfitted.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF. the undersigned, duly authorised thereto, have 
signed this Agreement
DONE at Washington this Rib day of July 1972 in duplicate, m the English 
and Russian languages, each text equally authentic..
For the Government of 
the Umted States of America:
Peter G fa tenon 
Earl L. ftuU
A p p e n d i x  3 .  For the Government of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
M Kuimw
*Z 20. ’ 9?5)
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*yaetii#d m Artiata t, ,t aball imiaedtototy aalify tba 
ttooaramaat af tb* USSR.
I« bath iaataa*#*. tb# l*arti#i mitt aanmtt at aaaa 
At ytaaibl* ia ardor to raaab agw anmnt aa yatailri# 
iruanlctiaa af grata ta to aaygRad to tba USSR yrtor 
to .mteebasa/aaia ae ranrlaatoa af raateaeta far tba 
yumbaw/aala af grain ia amaaata abaaa tMmt ^#*«. 
rted to Artiel# t.
Atrtcut vtl
It ia andarataad that tb* tbtymaot af mbaat and 
cam from tb# USA to tba UffSR aador tht* Agra#* 
aaant rbolt it* ia Afford with tb# yraoit ##* %f *h# 
AiM W M  Smut Agr##maat on Moritimo Matt*r* 
wMrh it ,n t irt* during t* • f»#r.od «f »S<;on#nt» 
hrrmindof,
A trie u  v tll
T V  fart.#* «o*u H*«d raaouitatiana mararamg tb# 
imyl#m#ntaoon of th.* Aff#**aaat aad v#lat#d mat* 
t<*ra %t .nt#ruai* of «t« month* bagtantog ait mmtb* 
aftor th# data of entry into fort* af tbit Agrronumt. 
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